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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.	
10/649,910	08/26/2003	Eric Bornstein	NOMS	5770	
John M. Garvey	7590 01/23/200 /	EXAMINER			
FOLEY & LAR	RDNER LLP	SHAY, DAVID M			
111 Huntington Avenue Boston, MA 02199			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER	
				3769	
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Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

		Application No.	Applicant(s)				
Office Action Summary		10/649,910	BORNSTEIN, ERIC				
		Examiner	Art Unit				
		david shay	3769				
Period fo	The MAILING DATE of this communication app or Reply	pears on the cover sheet with the c	orrespondence address				
A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION. - Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication. - If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication. - Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).							
Status							
1)⊠	Responsive to communication(s) filed on <u>Septe</u>	ember 16 2008					
· ·	This action is FINAL . 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.						
′=	Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is						
٠,١	closed in accordance with the practice under <i>Ex parte Quayle</i> , 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.						
Dispositi	on of Claims						
- 4)⊠	Claim(s) <u>21-31</u> is/are pending in the application	n					
•	4a) Of the above claim(s) is/are withdrawn from consideration.						
	5) Claim(s) is/are allowed.						
	6)⊠ Claim(s) <u>21-31</u> is/are rejected.						
· ·	Claim(s) is/are objected to.						
•	Claim(s) are subject to restriction and/o	r election requirement.					
	on Papers						
•	The specification is objected to by the Examine						
10)	The drawing(s) filed on is/are: a) ☐ acc						
	Applicant may not request that any objection to the	• , ,	* *				
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).							
11)	11) The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.						
Priority ι	ınder 35 U.S.C. § 119						
 12) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f). a) All b) Some coll None of: 1. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received. 2. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. 3. Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)). * See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received. 							
2) Notic 3) Inform	e of References Cited (PTO-892) e of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948) mation Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SB/08) r No(s)/Mail Date June 18 and 21, 2008.	4) Interview Summary Paper No(s)/Mail Da 5) Notice of Informal P 6) Other:	ite				

Applicant argues that with regard to the interview held on March 25, 2008, the examiner's interview summary indicates that agreement was reached, however the examiner explicitly stated at the interview that applicant's best chance for overcoming the combination involving Neuman et al was to argue non-combinability of the references.

Turning to Neuman et al, applicant argues that Neuman et al discuss not using the claimed wavelengths in vivo, as they damage the organisms which are being studied. The examiner notes that the criteria for obviousness is what the combined references would teach one of ordinary skill in the art. It is noted that in the instant case one of ordinary skill in the art is a doctor of medicine, dentistry, or veterinary science (see the instant disclosure at page 1, first paragraph under Field of the Invention) and as such requiring not only 12 years of primary and secondary school, but 4 years of college, 4 more years of medical school, and additional years as an intern before qualifying as, a one of the afore mentioned doctors. Given the high level of skill involved and given the fact that the Neuman et al article clearly states that the claimed wavelengths preferentially kill microorganisms, it is clear that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the wavelengths could be used for that purpose. The fact that the article is written in the context of preserving the micro organisms for study does not negate the fact that it clearly discloses within the four corners of the reference that these wavelengths are lethal to the one celled organisms.

With respect to L'Esperance, the examiner respectfully submits that applicant has misconstrued the theachings of this reference. Nowhere does L'Esperance disclose "blasting bacterial cells with lasers to cause thermolysis" as applicant appears to allege. The term "thermolysis" does not even appear in the text of the L'Esperance reference. In fact it is clear

from L'Esperance (see e.g. column 6, lines 39-65), that the chromophores used are the likes of HpD, which are well known to cause damage via singlet oxygen. Further, the lasers used by L'Esperance are less powerful (5-15 mW, see column 6, lines 56-65) than those used by Neuman et al (25 mW to 2 W, see page 2856, first column). Applicant's assertion of unexpected results is noted. However, it is unclear how the results of microbial death via exposure to these wavelengths can be termed "unexpected" when they are in fact reported by Neuman et al.

Applicant's arguments with respect to the double patenting rejections are noted. They are not convincing, however, because the use of the dental scaling instrument which emits the claimed wavelengths would inherently perform the claimed method.

The text of those sections of Title 35, U.S. Code not included in this action can be found in a prior Office action.

The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

Claims 26-31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

In claims 24-31, it is unclear what further step or what further limitation on an existing step is intended to be claimed by reciting the results of the irradiation. Claims 26 and 27 are further indefinite because they are duplicates. For the purposes of examination, claim 27 will be treated as depending from claim 22, as this appears to have been applicant's intent.

The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –

(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States.

Claims 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, and 30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) as being clearly anticipated by Clark et al.

See column 10, lines 31-40.

Claims 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, and 30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) as being clearly anticipated by Kumar et al.

See column 4, lines 13-65 and column 6, lines 10-31.

The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.

Claims 21-31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kumar et al. Kumar et al teach applying multiple wavelengths to the body by separate channels at numerous wavelengths, at least one in each of applicant's claimed ranges. It would have been obvious to the artisan of ordinary skill to employ the 930 nm wavelength range in the method of Kumar et al, since this is strongly absorbed by oxyhemoglobin and would provide important information about oxygen consumption in the brain, thus producing a method such as claimed.

Claims 21-31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over L'Esperance, Jr. in combination with Neuman et al. L'Esperance, Jr. teaches a device for sterilizing a site wherein two laser beams are projected onto the area to be sterilized. Neuman et al teach that bacteria are destroyed by wavelengths at 830 nm and 970 nm. It would have been

obvious to the artisan or ordinary skill to employ lasers producing the wavelengths of Neuman et al in the device of L'Esperance, Jr., since these wavelengths are effective for killing bacteria, as taught by Neuman et al, thus producing a method such as claimed.

The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. See *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and, *In re Thorington*, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).

A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent is shown to be commonly owned with this application. See 37 CFR 1.130(b).

Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

Claims 21-31 are rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1 and 2 of U.S. Patent No. 7,255,560. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims of the patent anticipate the claims of the application. Accordingly, instant application claims are not patentably distinct from the patent claims. Here, the patent claims require elements A, B, C, and D while instant application claim 1 only requires elements A, B, and C. Thus it is apparent that the more specific patent claims encompass the instant application claims. Following the rationale in In re Goodman cited in the preceding paragraph, where applicant has once been granted a patent containing a claim for the specific or narrower invention, applicant may not then obtain a second patent with a claim for the generic or broader invention without first submitting an appropriate terminal disclaimer.

Claims 21-31 are provisionally rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 11 and 14-21 of U.S. Patent Application No. 10/961,796. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims of the copending application anticipate the claims of the instant application. Accordingly, instant application claims are not patentably distinct from the copending application claims. Here, the copending application claims require elements A, B, C, and D while instant application claims only requires elements A, B, and C. Thus it is apparent that the more specific copending application claims encompass the instant application claims. Following the rationale in In re Goodman cited in the preceding paragraph, where applicant has once been granted a patent containing a claim for the specific or narrower invention, applicant may not then obtain a second patent with a claim for the generic or broader invention without first submitting an appropriate terminal disclaimer.

This is a <u>provisional</u> obviousness-type double patenting rejection because the conflicting claims have not in fact been patented.

Claims 21-31 are provisionally rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 6-22 of U.S. Patent Application No. 11/841,348. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims of the copending application anticipate the claims of the instant application. Accordingly, instant application claims are not patentably distinct from the copending application claims. Here, the copending application claims require elements A, B, C, and D while instant application claims only requires elements A, B, and C. Thus it is apparent that the more specific copending application claims encompass the instant

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application claims. Following the rationale in In re Goodman cited in the preceding paragraph, where applicant has once been granted a patent containing a claim for the specific or narrower invention, applicant may not then obtain a second patent with a claim for the generic or broader invention without first submitting an appropriate terminal disclaimer.

This is a <u>provisional</u> obviousness-type double patenting rejection because the conflicting claims have not in fact been patented.

Claims 21-31 are provisionally rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-24 of U.S. Patent Application No. 11/848,517. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims of the copending application anticipate the claims of the instant application. Accordingly, instant application claims are not patentably distinct from the copending application claims. Here, the copending application claims require elements A, B, C, and D while instant application claims only requires elements A, B, and C. Thus it is apparent that the more specific copending application claims encompass the instant application claims. Following the rationale in In re Goodman cited in the preceding paragraph, where applicant has once been granted a patent containing a claim for the specific or narrower invention, applicant may not then obtain a second patent with a claim for the generic or broader invention without first submitting an appropriate terminal disclaimer.

This is a <u>provisional</u> obviousness-type double patenting rejection because the conflicting claims have not in fact been patented.

Claims 21-31 are provisionally rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 45-80 of U.S. Patent

Application No. 11/880,769. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims of the copending application anticipate the claims of the instant application. Accordingly, instant application claims are not patentably distinct from the copending application claims. Here, the copending application claims require elements A, B, C, and D while instant application claims only requires elements A, B, and C. Thus it is apparent that the more specific copending application claims encompass the instant application claims. Following the rationale in In re Goodman cited in the preceding paragraph, where applicant has once been granted a patent containing a claim for the specific or narrower invention, applicant may not then obtain a second patent with a claim for the generic or broader invention without first submitting an appropriate terminal disclaimer.

This is a <u>provisional</u> obviousness-type double patenting rejection because the conflicting claims have not in fact been patented.

Applicant's arguments with respect to claims 21-31 have been considered but are moot in view of the new ground(s) of rejection.

Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL**. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37

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CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to david shay whose telephone number is (571) 272-4773. The examiner can normally be reached on Tuesday through Friday from 6:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Henry Johnson, can be reached on Monday through Friday from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

/david shay/

Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3769